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Abstract 
Given the strong evidence that most environmental migration is likely to occur within the 
Global South, the analysis of this paper and many of its recommendations focus on EU 
external and humanitarian policies in the field of environmental migration, as well as foreign 
policy and humanitarian aid and development-cooperation programs implemented in 
conflict-affected countries. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the environmental 
migration debate with a multifaceted perspective that takes into account the relationship 
between climate change, migration and conflict. In doing so, it aims to highlight areas of 
particular political and geopolitical interest where further EU legal, policy, and humanitarian 
action is needed. On the basis of the analyzed legal, political, and institutional frameworks 
and the critical issues raised from the programs implemented in the field, I will indicate 
areas of political and geopolitical interest for EU external action and humanitarian aid 
strategy and where further EU policy action is needed. 
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1. Introduction 
Climate change and environmental degradation strongly affect local, regional and 
international dynamics of human mobility from and in conflict-affected countries. Despite 
this fact, the EU currently has no rational legal or policy approach on how to face 
environmentally-induced migration or displacement. People who move due to long-term 
environmental change are seen as voluntary or economic migrants with no entitlement to 
protection, while those moving after sudden environmental disasters often qualify for short-
term humanitarian aid, but not longer-term support.  
 
This status does not change at the international level. Migrants facing climate change or 
environmental degradation are not included or protected under the International Refugee 
Law, which developed out of the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol.1 They also 
lack protection under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights that guarantees the right to 
asylum but limits it to cases of persecution as defined by the 1951 Refugee Convention.2 This 
lack of recognition has led several scholars to encourage the creation of an international law 
framework to address the plight of environmental migrants in need of humanitarian 
protection.3 
 
Similarly, since the end of the 1990s, several European policy documents have emphasized 
the need for further analysis in order to provide a better understanding of the phenomenon 
and its corresponding legal and policy gaps, including the latest European Commission’s Staff 
Working Document “Climate Change, Environmental Degradation, and Migration” from April 
2013.4 Taking this context as a starting point, this research examines environmental-forced 
migration from conflict-affected countries, particularly examining the role played by climate 
change as a “threat multiplier, which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instability”.5 
 
Given the strong evidence that most environmental migration is likely to occur within the 
Global South,6 this paper’s analysis and many of its recommendations will focus exclusively 
on the EU’s external and humanitarian policies in the field of environmental migration, 
including development and foreign policy, as well as humanitarian aid programs 
implemented in conflict-affected countries.  
 
                                                     
1 See McNamara, Karen E. 2007. "Conceptualizing Discourses on Environmental Refugees at the United 
Nations." Population and Environment: A Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies 29(1): 12–24. 
2  See Kälin Walter and Nina Schrepfer. February 2012. “Protecting People Crossing Borders in the Context of 
Climate Change Normative Gaps and Possible Approaches”. UNHCR Legal and Protection Policy Research 
Series, PPLA/2012/01, 25.  
3 See, as instance, Biermann, Frank and Ingrid Boas. 2010. "Preparing for a warmer world: Towards a global 
governance system to protect climate refugees", Global Environmental Politics, 10(1): 60-88. 
4 European Commission. April 16, 2013. Commission Staff Working Document. "Climate Change, 
Environmental Degradation, and Migration." Accompanying the document "Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions "An EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change." 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/adaptation/what/docs/swd_2013_138_en.pdf . 
5 United Nations. July 2011. Secretary-General's remarks to the Security Council on the Impact of Climate 
Change on International Peace and Security, 3, http://www.un.org/sg/statements/?nid=5424 .  
6 European Commission. April 16, 2013. Commission Staff Working Document. "Climate Change, 
Environmental Degradation, and Migration." Accompanying the document "Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions "An EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change." 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/adaptation/what/docs/swd_2013_138_en.pdf . 
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Does climate change threaten to overburden states and regions that are already fragile and 
conflict prone? If so, what are the implications for the EU’s external actions in conflict-
affected countries? To what extent is the existing EU external strategy adequate when facing 
environmental migrants from post-conflict settings? Finally, what role can and should the EU 
play to sufficiently respond to the challenges of climate change and migration in these kinds 
of settings?  
 
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the environmental migration debate with a 
multifaceted perspective that takes into account the relationship between climate change, 
migration, and conflict while highlighting areas of particular political and geopolitical interest 
requiring further EU legal, policy, and humanitarian action. To date, the EU's response to 
environmental migrants from conflict-affected countries continues to isolate the conflict 
dimension as the main driver of migration or displacement; this paper, however, argues that 
EU policy following the 2013 Commission Staff Working Document (CSWD) - when the EU 
declared itself committed to addressing the issue of environmental migrations - has proven 
ineffective and declamatory.  
 
Accordingly, this paper asserts that the EU’s current political and diplomatic position has 
neglected the importance of the environmental migrants that come from, or are hosted by, 
conflict-affected countries, and that this approach has resulted in a vague response to such 
humanitarian concerns. To make this argument, I defend the view that, while EU-funded 
research and policy papers on climate migration are plentiful, no specific policy acts or 
programs address specifically the topic of multi-victimized environmental migrants. Through 
analysis of EU policies, programs, and governance structure, I will demonstrate how the EU’s 
policymaking continues to ignore the increased forced environmental migratory flows from 
conflict-affected countries, as well as how this lack of attention could undermine the EU’s 
external action credibility.  
 
Emerging security challenges posed by environmental migrations have forced the EU to 
shake the rust from its old toolbox and respond to what UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon 
defined as a “threat to international peace and security.” Despite these realities, I argue that 
better humanitarian action from the EU is still needed. 
 
This paper further claims that the EU must re-examine the policies that led to the current 
European policy framework on environmental migrations from conflict-affected countries. 
Policymakers should abandon indecision and ambiguity toward this phenomenon and fully 
include it in the external dimension of the EU´s migration policy.  
 
I advance these arguments in the following order. Firstly, I provide a critical review of the 
major initiatives relevant to environmental change and migration at the EU level with a 
particular focus on the main EU policies, programs, and governance structure concerning 
environmental migrants originating in or directed towards conflict-affected countries. In this 
review, I attempt to understand the main challenges and gaps relevant to legal, normative, 
and institutional frameworks.  
 
Secondly, I assess the impact of environmental migration in these settings, providing greater 
detail on EU actions led by the Commission's Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and 
Civil Protection (ECHO). On the basis of the analyzed legal, political, and institutional 
frameworks, as well as the critiques raised from the programs implemented in the field, I 
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will indicate areas of political and geopolitical interest for EU external action and 
humanitarian aid strategy where further EU policy action is needed. I conclude by providing 
recommendations to European policy makers regarding priority areas of political interest 
where further policy action is needed to overcome the identified gaps.  
 
The methodology for this study comprises a desk-based analysis of academic literature and 
secondary materials including EU reports and statistics along with reports by international 
organizations and NGOs. Additionally, insights and extra information were collected through 
three semi-structured interviews to three key informants working at the EU level and with 
international organizations, and informal conversations with people working both at EU and 
International level in this field of research. Notes from the semi-structured interviews and 
from the informal talks were transcribed during and after each conversations and all data 
material was analyzed qualitatively. 
 
2. Environmental Migrations from Conflict-Affected 
Countries. An Analysis of the EU Policies, Programs and 
Structure of Governance 
 
Few imagine that EU Member States would seriously entertain conversations on 
environmental migrants from conflict-affected countries. However, given the international 
debate and the link between migration and climate change, the EU has started to reflect on 
how to adjust its policy.  
 
As observed by Geddes and Somerville, “the European Union holds substantial regulatory 
powers over the environment and increasing power over migration. The complex, multi-
polar and multi-faceted governance regime in Europe on migration and environment thus 
holds significant potential for policy developments on migration linked to climate change”.7 
 
Historically, the European Parliament was the first institution to try to open new legal and 
policy frameworks to face climate migrations, starting by mentioning them in its 1990s 
resolutions on the environment, security and foreign policy.8 This first EU act explicitly called 
for attention to be paid to “the impact of climate migrants on the EU immigration policies, 
on the humanitarian aid and, indirectly, in the increased security problems for the EU in the 
form of regional instability in other parts of the world”. 9 
 
In the recent years, MEPs from the Greens Party and SD have organized several seminars 
and hearings on this subject.10 The Greens/European Free Alliance group launched its latest 
                                                     
7 Geddes, Andrew and Somerville, James. May 2013. "Migration and Environmental Change: Assessing the 
Developing European Approach". Policy Brief Series (2). Migration Policy Institute, 2. 
8 European Parliament. January 14, 1999. "Report on the Environment, Security and Foreign Policy." 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A4-1999-
0005+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN. 
9 European Parliament. January 14, 1999. "Report on the Environment, Security and Foreign Policy." 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A4-1999-
0005+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN.  
10  As told by the GREENS’ MeP Jane Lambert, in 2011, the S&D group hosted a seminar entitled "Climate 
Refugees—A New Arena for Human Rights."  
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initiative in 2013 - adopting the position paper, “Climate Change, Refugees and Migration.”11 
Starting from the absence of a coherent policy proposal from the EU on how to respond to 
the phenomenon of environmental migration, this document suggests using the provisions 
contained in the Lisbon Treaty to amend the EU’s asylum and immigration policy in order to 
regulate climate migration. The Greens’ awareness of the humanitarian implications of 
climate migrations represents one of the few attempts to question the security-centered 
approach that has characterized the climate migration actions promoted by the European 
Commission and the Council. 
 
In 2008, the paper “Climate change and international security” prepared by the High 
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Commission 
drew attention to the fact that climate change could serve as a “threat-multiplier”, 
exacerbating trends, tensions and instabilities that already influence migration patterns.12 
The document argued that Europe must expect substantially increased migratory pressure 
and recommended the development of EU capacities by building up knowledge and systems 
of monitoring and early warning. It further emphasized the role of the EU’s multilateral 
leadership in promoting global climate security by considering “environmentally-triggered 
additional migratory stress in the further development of a comprehensive European 
migration policy, in liaison with all relevant international bodies”.13 
 
One year later, in 2009, the European Council included a paragraph on climate change and 
migration in the Stockholm Programme, stressing the need to explore the connection 
between climate change, migration and development, whilst urging the European 
Commission to carry out “an analysis of the effects of climate change on international 
migration, including its potential effects on immigration to the Union”.14 
 
To address this need, the European Commission organized a high-level, multi-stakeholder 
consultation to discuss the linkages between climate change and migration and to gather 
recent data and the latest thinking on climate change’s effects on migration and 
displacement. Informants from the International Organization for Migration and the 
European Parliament15 have stressed that this consultation was the first explicitly integrated 
analysis of different topics, such as forecast scenarios, evidence of the migration/climate 
change link, potential measures to increase third countries’ resilience capacities, 
preparedness and protection responses to displacement, as well as legal frameworks to 
protect climate/environmental migrants. At the same time, the International Center for 
Migration Policy Development presented a study commissioned by the European Parliament 
on the legal and policy responses to environmentally-induced migration.16 
                                                     
11 The Greens/EFA in the European Parliament position paper on climate change, refugees, and migration, 
adopted in May 2013, was drafted by Hélène Flautre, Jean Lambert, Ska Keller, and Barbara Lochbihler. 
“Position Paper. Climate Change, Refugees and Migration”, accessed January 21, 2015, http://barbara 
lochbihler.de/cms/upload/PDF_2013/Greens_EFA__PositionPaper_Climate_ChangeRefugeesandMigration.p
df. 
12 European Commission. March 14, 2008. Joint Paper from the High Representative to the European Council, 
"Climate Change and International Security" S113/08.  
13  Council of the European Union. March 3, 2008. "Climate Change and International Security." 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%207249%202008%20INIT, 11.  
14  European Council. 2009. "The Stockholm Programme —An Open and Secure Europe Serving and 
Protecting Citizens.14449/09, JAI 679”, 42. 
15 Jo De Backer from the IOM Regional Office for the European Economic Area, the EU and NATO (Brussels), 
and the Greens’ MeP Jean Lambert.  
16 International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD). 2011. "'Climate Refugees.' Legal and policy 
responses to environmentally induced migration." Brussels: Directorate-General for Internal Policies Policy 
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The European Council’s conclusions on EU Climate Diplomacy, adopted in July 2011,17 
marked a shift from theoretical analysis to the identification of specific policies. The 
conclusions highlighted that climate change is a global environmental and development 
challenge with significant implications for security and migration. It also acknowledged the 
Joint Reflection Paper from the High Representative and the Commission, which sets out 
three strands for action on EU climate diplomacy:  
 
 strengthening engagement with key partners,  
 supporting developing countries, and 
 mitigating security risks. 
 
In May 2012, this plan was endorsed by the European Council’s conclusions in the EU Global 
Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM), which recognized the need to further explore 
the links between climate change, migration and development, including the potential 
impact of climate change on migration and displacement.18 This background pre-empted the 
development of the April 2013 CSWD document, “Climate Change, Environmental 
Degradation and Migration”.19 The CSWD represents the culmination of the European 
Commission’s efforts to commence a dialog on the inter-linkages between migration, 
environmental degradation and climate change. The European Commission produced the 
CSWD in response to a request made by the European Council to the Commission in the 
Stockholm Program seeking an analysis of the effects of climate change on international 
migration, including its potential effects on immigration to the European Union. The CSWD 
also provides an overview of the research and data currently available on the inter-linkages 
between migration, environmental degradation, and climate change along with a list of 
current EU activities in various policy fields. 
 
Following this paper, on July 19, 2013, the Council of the European Union released 
conclusions on the 2013 UN High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development, 
broadening the development-migration nexus by acknowledging that “climate and 
environmental degradation are already exerting an increasing influence on migration and 
mobility and therefore… the linkages between climate change, environmental degradation 
and migration should be further explored and addressed as appropriate, in particular in the 
context of development cooperation, foreign policy and humanitarian assistance”. 20 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs, Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2011/462422/IPOL-
LIBE_ET(2011)462422_EN.pdf.  
17 European Council. July 18, 2011. "Council Conclusions on EU Climate Diplomacy," 3106th Foreign Affairs 
Council Meeting. Brussels.  
18 Furthermore, in July and September 2012, the European Commission organized two roundtables on 
migration as an adaptation strategy to climate change and the development impact of forced and 
environmental migration, respectively. 
19 European Commission. April 16, 2013a. Commission Staff Working Document. "Climate Change, 
Environmental Degradation, and Migration." Accompanying the document "Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions "An EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change." 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/adaptation/what/docs/swd_2013_138_en.pdf . 
20 Council of the European Union. July 19, 2013. Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of 
Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council on the 2013 UN High-Level Dialogue on 
Migration and Development and on broadening the development-migration nexus. 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2012415%202013%20INIT . 
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More importantly, the Council of the European Union’s act emphasized that “the EU and its 
Member States should urgently take steps to deepen knowledge and further develop policy 
on a number of challenges which deserve further attention, including addressing the links 
between climate change, environmental degradation and migration, integrating protracted 
refugee situations into development planning, and strengthening the impact of migration on 
the development of both countries of destination and origin”.21 
 
Due to the growing interdependencies with other policy fields, such as security, 
conflict and migration, the EU’s diplomatic body, the European External Action Service 
(EEAS) has increasingly acknowledged the external dimension of climate change. In a 2008 
revision of the EEAS’s European Security Strategy, climate change was described as a core 
strategic challenge.22 Later, in July 2011, the EEAS, together with the European Commission, 
prepared a Joint Reflection Paper that reinforced the EEAS’s commitment to linking climate 
change policies to the EU’s core security policies: “While climate change alone does not 
cause conflict, it is leading to increased competition for scare natural resources, further 
weakens fragile governments and exacerbates migratory pressures. More extreme weather 
events may lead to increased demands for EU Member States to provide humanitarian aid 
including civil/military co-operation, in disaster relief operations in third states”.23 In 2012, 
the EEAS took over the EU’s Green Diplomacy Network,24 an initiative that works towards 
better integration of EU environment policies into external relations practices through the 
exchange of information among member states and the commission’s diplomatic networks. 
 
In 2013, the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council adopted the conclusions on climate diplomacy and 
security,25 together with a new EEAS reflection paper.26 These documents oblige ministers to 
annually review the progress made in introducing security policy parameters into climate 
change strategies. The reflection paper also claims that “more preventive diplomacy needs 
to be conducted, in particular by sharpening an EU narrative on the intricate links between 
climate changes, international and human security and natural resource scarcity and on how 
these links shape future prosperity, stability and development. This includes examination of 
climate impacts in developed, as well as vulnerable, countries”.27  
 
Regrettably, all of these commitments were not taken into account during the drafting of 
what has been defined as “the example of a long-term policy”: the European Council’s 
agreement on the new climate and energy policy framework for 2020 to 2030, reached on 
                                                     
21 Council of the European Union. July 19, 2013. Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of 
Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council on the 2013 UN High-Level Dialogue on 
Migration and Development and on broadening the development-migration nexus, 13, 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2012415%202013%20INIT.  
22 European Union. December 11, 2008. "Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy- 
Providing Security in a Changing World." 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf . 
23 European External Action Service. 2011. "Joint Reflection Paper. Towards a renewed and strengthened EU 
climate diplomacy." European Commission. 
http://eeas.europa.eu/environment/docs/2011_joint_paper_euclimate_diplomacy_en.pdf. 
24 The EU GDN uses the EU member state and commission's extensive diplomatic networks to provide an 
effective means of gathering and exchanging information. 
25 Council of the European Union. June 24, 2013. "Council Conclusions on EU Climate Diplomacy." Foreign 
Affairs Council meeting, Brussels. 
http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/137587.pdf. 
26 European Union External Action Service. March 26, 2013. "EU Climate Diplomacy for 2015 and Beyond." 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/international/negotiations/docs/eeas_26062013_en.pdf.  
27 European Union External Action Service. March 26, 2013. "EU Climate Diplomacy for 2015 and beyond”, 5, 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/international/negotiations/docs/eeas_26062013_en.pdf . 
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October 23 and 24, 2014.28 This new framework will form the structure of the EU’s 
contribution to preparations for the global climate negotiations, which will take place in 
2015 in Paris. This agreement promises to curb greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) by 40% by 
2030 compared to 1990 levels, increase the amount of renewable energy to at least 27%, 
and set a non-binding target to reduce energy demand by at least 27%.  
 
Van Rompuy, former President of the European Council, posted on his Twitter account 
immediately after the summit: “Deal! At least 40% emissions cut by 2030. World’s most 
ambitious, cost-effective, fair EU2030 climate energy policy agreed.” However, not all that 
glitters is gold. Emmanouilidis, from the European Policy Center, explains why the 
Conclusions’ targets could fall short, when stating “following pressure from a number of 
governments, EU leaders have agreed on a ‘flexibility clause’ which will allow member states 
to come back to this issue after the global climate talks in Paris”.29 This flexibility clause 
implies that targets could be adapted in light of the outcome of these negotiations. 
Similarly, many NGOs and the Greens Party30 claim that the Council Conclusions represent 
just the beginning of the (wannabe) new political process celebrated by Van Rompuy. For 
them, the Council’s Conclusions are inadequate and unfair, as they do not make any tangible 
contribution to human security dynamics in less developed countries caused by climate 
change. Natalia Alonso, Oxfam’s Deputy Director of Advocacy & Campaigns has observed:  
“Today’s target of at least 40% of emissions reductions is 
welcome but only a first step, which falls far too short of what 
the EU needs to do to pull its weight in the fight against climate 
change. Insufficient action like this from the world’s richest 
countries places yet more burden on the poorest people most 
affected by climate change, but least responsible for causing 
this crisis.”31 
Contrary to what has been stated in the Council Conclusions on “Climate Change and 
International Security”32 and despite the Commission’s recommendations33, the European 
                                                     
28 European Council, 23 October 2014. "2030 Climate and Energy Policy Framework". 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/145356.pdf . 
29 Emmanouilidis, Janis A. 27 October 2014. "Low key but not low impact: the results of the EU’s ‘transition’ 
summit.”European Policy Center, 4, http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_4935_post-summit_analysis_-
_27_october_2014.pdf. 
30 See "EU leaders squeeze life out of climate and clean energy policy at crucial juncture", accessed January 
21, 2015,  http://www.greens-efa.eu/eu-summit-13028.html and "EU leaders agree on weak and compromised 
climate and energy targets", accessed January 21, 2015,  http://www.caneurope.org/media-center/can-and-
press/763-european-council-eu-leaders-agree-on-weak-and-compromised-climate-and-energy-targets. 
31 "Europe must review climate targets after weak climate package deal", accessed January 21, 2015, 
http://www.oxfam.org/en/grow/pressroom/reactions/europe-must-review-climate-targets-after-weak-climate-
package-deal. 
32 Council of the European Union. March 3, 2008. "Climate Change and International Security." 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%207249%202008%20INIT. 
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compromise reached last October falls short both in addressing the links between climate 
change, environmental degradation and migration, as well as in enhancing coherence within 
the EU climate diplomacy mechanism.  
Last Council Conclusions make no reference to addressing environmentally induced 
migration, narrowing the discussion agenda to the EU-centered economic perspective. In 
this context, the Global South is notably absent. No policy responses have been put forward 
to address the effects of climate change in the developing world, and no planning addresses 
the actions required to mitigate and adapt due to environmental change and migration in 
affected countries. 
Even though the EU has declared that addressing the global climate is in its own long-term 
interest, it remains unclear as to how EU policymakers will respond to environmental 
displacements. As many scholars observed, at the international and EU levels,34 existing 
agreements and instruments are not designed to deal with international migration related 
to climate change. Meanwhile, the Council’s political agenda continues to be dominated by 
arguments related to energy savings and EU climate policy, leaving little room for other 
areas of climate policy-making, such as those related to human mobility, food security, local 
environmental quality, energy access, livelihoods, and fair sustainable development.  
This approach also contrasts with the findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC),35 whose latest fifth report, released on November 4, 2014, has once again 
reaffirmed that climate change is projected to increase displacement of people in the Global 
South: “Populations that lack the resources for planned migration experience higher 
exposure to extreme weather events, particularly in developing countries with low income. 
Climate change can indirectly increase risks of violent conflicts by amplifying well-
documented drivers of these conflicts such as poverty and economic shocks”.36 
The upcoming UN Climate Change conference that will be held in Lima in December 201437 
will indicate whether the EU is determined to improve the global effectiveness of its climate 
strategy. Interestingly, there has been a change of pace at the European Environmental 
Council; during its October 28, 2014 meeting in preparation for the Lima Conference, the 
Council emphasized “that the 2015 agreement should contribute to assisting all countries, 
especially the particularly vulnerable ones, to achieve climate-resilient sustainable 
development”.38 Although this acknowledgement may appear to be a last minute corrective 
                                                                                                                                                        
33 European Commission. April 16, 2013. Commission Staff Working Document. "Climate Change, 
Environmental Degradation, and Migration." Accompanying the document "Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions "An EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change." 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/adaptation/what/docs/swd_2013_138_en.pdf . 
34 Bates, Diane C. 2002. "Environmental Refugees? Classifying Human Migrations Caused by Environmental 
Change." Population and Environment 23 (5): 465-477; McLeman Robert and Lori M. Hunter. 2010. "Migration 
in the Context of Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change: Insights from Analogues." Wiley 
Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change 1(3): 450–461. 
35 See “Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change”, accessed January 21, 2015, http://www.ipcc.ch/ . 
36 IPCC. 2014a. “Fifth Assessment Synthesis Report", 16, http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_SPMcorr1.pdf .  
37 The Lima Conference is the last of the intermediate conferences between Durban, where the mandate to 
negotiate a global agreement by 2015 was decided, and Paris, where the global agreement will be adopted in 
December 2015. 
38 Council of the European Union, 28 October 2014. “Council conclusions on Preparations for the 20th session 
of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the 
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measure towards a large-scale effort climate policy, it also represents real potential. Perhaps 
the issue of climate migration can be addressed holistically within the EU energy strategy in 
line with the IPCCS’s assumption, according to which “climate change is a global commons 
problem, and it is characterized by a high degree of heterogeneity in the origins of 
emissions, mitigation opportunities, climate impacts, and capacity for mitigation and 
adaptation”.39 
 
2.1 EU's Policy Response to Environmental Migrations: Not Ready for 
Prime Time? 
While the measures analyzed above confirm that climate security is now firmly rooted in the 
EU policy agenda, EU practical actions concerning environmentally forced migrations 
continue to be limited if not entirely deficient. Notwithstanding the profusion of 
commitments, to date the EU declaratory plans are still waiting to be translated into 
effective and coordinated policy developments. 
 
Two main reasons that go some way to explaining this stalemate are: 
1. polarization between the external and internal dimensions of environment-related 
migration policy, and  
2. poor coordination between EU services dealing with climate-driven migrations. 
 
While EU Member States have rhetorically integrated restrictive internal immigration 
policies with a strategy based on cooperation with third,40 their policy remains in practice 
incomplete. They do not reserve any specific legal and policy provisions addressing the 
phenomenon of climate migrants at the EU internal level. Additionally, despite both the 
internal and external dimensions mentioned as relevant by almost all documents on climate 
migrations produced by the European Commission, the Development and Cooperation 
Directorate (rather than by the Directorate Covering Internal Affairs) de facto wrote the 
CSDW.41  Far from being irrelevant, this authorship has many implications, the most 
important of which is the implication of an incomplete understanding of environmentally 
related migrations. These migrations have been described as a kind of human mobility 
mainly occurring “in the developing world, either with migrants moving internally or to 
countries in the same regions”.42  
 
Notwithstanding the absence of reliable data to prove that climate-affected people do not 
affect mixed migratory flows towards Europe, the European Commission has deliberately 
                                                                                                                                                        
10th session of the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol", 3, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/envir/145508.pdf  
39 IPCC. 2014. "Technical Summary", 14, http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2014/tp/10.pdf . 
40 On this question, see, as instance, Collyer, Michael 2007.  "Migrants, migration and the security paradigm; 
constraints and opportunities’, Mediterranean Politics.” 11(2): 255-270; De Haas, Hein. 2008. "The myth of 
invasion. The inconvenient realities of African migration to Europe." Third World Quarterly, 29(7): 1305‐1322. 
41 See the analysis made by Youngs, Richard. May 2014. Climate Change and EU Security Policy. An Unmet 
Challenge. Carnegie Europe, 12. 
42 European Commission. April 16, 2013. Commission Staff Working Document. "Climate Change, 
Environmental Degradation, and Migration." Accompanying the document "Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions "An EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change.", 15, 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/adaptation/what/docs/swd_2013_138_en.pdf. 
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upstaged the EU's internal implications of environment migrations. It pays no attention to 
the fact that migrants who would like to move to the EU from climate-affected contexts 
would in most cases not be able to do so lawfully, especially if they are unskilled and lacking 
humanitarian protection.43  
 
No less important is the analysis of the activities led by the EEAS and the Commission’s 
Services in charge of Climate Migrations (“Home”, “Development and Cooperation”, and 
“Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection” [ECHO]), which confirms- as noted by Kunz, Lavenex 
and Panizzon- how the implementation of coordinated effective migration policy remains a 
challenge for the EU’s multi-layered level of competence and governance.44  
 
The absence of concrete progress in understanding the strategic, political, and humanitarian 
risks associated with climate change is primarily attributable to the overlapping of 
competences among the EU institutional actors in charge of internal and external actions 
concerning environmental migrants, especially those coming from conflict-affected 
countries. Information from key informants has confirmed that the responsibilities for 
climate migration are split in a puzzling manner between three different EC Directorates-
General (DG Home, DG DEVCO and DG ECHO), flanking the External Action EEAS. Neither 
these Directorates, nor the EEAS are tasked explicitly with leading environment-related 
migration. As stressed by the source from the Greens, “Even if the CSWD explicitly assigns 
the management of environment-induced migratory flows to the EEAS and the DG DEVCO, 
the question of who must do what has not been properly addressed.” 45 
 
The Lisbon Treaty did not specify how the new institutional setting would work in practice 
when it came into force on December 1, 2009. Additionally, when the EEAS became 
operational on January 1, 2011, it remained unclear exactly what position it was to occupy in 
the pluralistic EU external policy-making system, where Member States and supranational 
actors already operate with varying degrees of autonomy and influence.46 According to the 
MEP Jean Lambert,47 these incoherencies were further exacerbated by the attempt to 
introduce the humanitarian dimension and the related migration policy discussion into the 
EC’s DG Clima activities. This was the institutional arena established in 2010 to lead 
international negotiations on climate and to develop and implement the EU Emissions 
Trading System, a directorate described by one interviewed Greens’ MEP as being caught “in 
the trap of economic growth and structurally resistant to the dialogue with the DGs in 
charge of climate migration.”   
 
To improve the balance of the internal and external dimensions in the management of 
climate-driven migrations, at the end of 2013, the EU High Representative and the 
commission jointly indicated steps that the EU should collectively take towards a 
comprehensive approach in policy and action. This communication states that common 
actions should cover all stages of the cycle of conflict or other external crises: from early 
                                                     
43 On this lack of attention, see, as instance, Piguet, Etienne. 2008. "Climate change and forced migration." 
New Issues in Refugee Research 153 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee. 
http://www.unhcr.org/47a316182.pdf.  
44 Kunz, Rachel, Sandra Lavenex and Marion Panizzon, 2011.  Multilayered migration governance: the 
promise of partnership. New York: Routledge.  
45 MeP J. Lambert. 
46 On this, see Furness, Mark. 2011. "Who controls the European External Action Service? Agent autonomy in 
EU external relations." German Development Institute.  http://www.euce.org/eusa/2011/papers/5i_furness.pdf.   
47 Information collected on July 2014.  
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warning and preparedness, conflict prevention, crisis response, and management to early 
recovery, stabilization, and peace building. These actions would assist in helping countries 
get back on track towards sustainable long-term development. However, despite this 
strategy, it is not clear how the EEAS and the commission should cooperate to ensure 
strategic and operational coherence in external policy and strategy, including the internal 
impact of external policies. 
 
Additionally, as observed by a source from IOM, the external dimension represents the 
leading element of the EU's action in the field of climate migrants, yet it remains insufficient 
because it continues to be dominated by internal EU considerations. These actions aim to 
contain or manage migratory and refugee flows into EU territory. This issue represents the 
main obstacle to including new forms of migration into the EU’s external policy objectives, 
such as those caused by environmental degradation and climate change. 
 
 
3. How the EU Works on the Ground with the Environment-
Related Migratory Flows  
 
3.1 The EU’s Action on the Ground 
Even though the potential security implications of climate are increasingly recognized in the 
scientific community,48 a broad reflection is still absent in putting together the issues of 
climate justice, humanitarian aid and EU external policy. As most environmental migration is 
likely to occur within the Global South, this part of the research aims to analyze EU external 
policy and humanitarian aid programs implemented in conflict-affected countries to handle 
environment-related migrations.  
Which EU actions have been put in place to assist fragile and conflict prone countries or to 
host environment-related migratory flows? What should the EU do on the ground to 
adequately respond to the challenges posed by this kind of migration?  
 
The EU is making progress in identifying the wide-ranging repercussions of climate change, 
but to date, there is no comprehensive strategy for managing the migratory flows related to 
climate-induced geopolitical instability in conflict-affected countries. The EEAS's Strategy for 
2015 and Beyond,49 recognizes the need to launch an innovative preventive action that 
holistically addresses the complex links between climate change, economic development, 
international security, and migration; however, efforts to better understand what the EU 
should do to face this challenge and how this nexus should operate in the field remain 
unsatisfactory.  
 
Critically assessing the main achievements reached by the EU in this field, Young has 
observed that the “recognition of the link between climate change and conflict has not 
prompted any significant upgrade in EU conflict-prevention efforts nor has it led to 
qualitatively different approaches to conflict resolution that are directly tied to climate-
                                                     
48   See, as instance the studies of Depledge, Duncan and Tobin Feakin. 2012. "Climate Change and 
International Institutions: the Implications for Security." Climate Policy. 12(1): 73-84; Dupont, Alan. 2008. "The 
Strategic Implications of Climate Change.” Survival. 50: 29–54. 
49 European Union External Action Service. March 26, 2013a. "EU Climate Diplomacy for 2015 and Beyond." 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/international/negotiations/docs/eeas_26062013_en.pdf. 
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related risk indicators”.50 This point is indisputable given that the EU’s tangible actions to 
date remain limited to mere disaster response despite commitments towards the 
implementation of an early warning system expressly dedicated to climate-induced 
instability.  
 
Many reasons explain this “ex-post” approach. Historically, Betsy observes both research 
and policy have separately addressed environment and international migration's linkages 
with institutional transition and conflict or post-conflict dynamics.51 This situation has 
existed since the beginning through the EU’s single-issue strategy. The recent advent of the 
comprehensive approach has not actually improved the EU’s propensity to plan effective 
interventions designed to understand and address the multi-directional and multi-causal 
relationships between climate change, environmental degradation, and its related long-term 
and short-term migration patterns.52  
 
However, it is important to consider that the role of climate change, together with other 
conflict-generating mechanisms, 53  is not secondary, especially if viewed from the 
perspective of the preventive actions that the EU can enact in conflict-affected countries 
that produce or receive climate migrants. To date, none of the three Commission 
Directorates (DG Home, DG DEVCO nor DG ECHO), nor the EEAS delegations deployed in the 
field have in-depth knowledge of the phenomenon, nor do they strive to gather, compile, 
and make available information on the affected countries. 54  This partial knowledge 
negatively affects the possibility of providing effective support to the affected countries and 
population groups. Without this knowledge, it is impossible to implement programs and 
activities aimed at building the capacity of local governments and stakeholders in order to 
respond effectively to the challenges presented by climate change, environmental 
degradation, and migration nexus. 
 
The slowness of European action on the ground probably results from the absence of a well-
defined conflict prevention program at the EU level that also addresses environmental-
related conflict. In 2001, the adoption of the EU Program for the Prevention of Violent 
Conflicts defined the main aspects of the EU conflict prevention rationale.55 A decade later, 
the Council Conclusions on Conflict Prevention still consider early warning and early action 
as priority areas to be further strengthened.56 This scenario has also been confirmed by the 
EU-funded project Initiative for Peace building—Early Warning, which highlights the fact 
that the EU has no clear early warning system in its operational areas: “Most EU staff 
interviewed during the research - it has been observed - could not relate to nor felt part of 
                                                     
50 Youngs, Richard. May 2014. Climate Change and EU Security Policy. An Unmet Challenge. Carnegie 
Europe, 9. 
51 Hartmann, Betsy. 2009. " From Climate Refugees to Climate Conflict: who is taking the Heat for Global 
Warming? “ In Salih, M. (ed.), Climate Change and Sustainable Development: New Challenges for Poverty 
Reduction. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishers, 142-155. 
52 European Commission, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 
December 11, 2013. Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, "The EU's 
Comprehensive Approach to External Conflicts and Crises." JOIN (2013) 30 final. 
53 Salehian, Idean and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch (2006). "Refugee Flows and the Spread of civil war," 
International Organization, 60(2): 335–366. 
54 Information taken from informal talks with people deployed on the ground. 
55 Council of the European Union. June 7, 2001. "Draft European Union Program for the Prevention of Violent 
Conflicts." http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%209537%202001%20REV%201. 
56 Council of the European Union. June 20, 2011. "Council Conclusions on Conflict Prevention." 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/122911.pdf. 
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an EU early warning system. There were also diverging views on the actual purpose of early 
warning systems”.57 
 
Findings like these suggest that the ineffectiveness of the EU’s early warning system can be 
ascribed first to the absence of a shared strategy among the key actors of the EU’s early 
warning system. Since 2011, together with the EC’s Crisis Room, the EEAS’s Conflict 
Prevention, Peace Building and Mediation Instruments Division has tried to promote a joint 
prevention program. As confirmed by the key informants interviewed, efforts by the EU Joint 
Situation Centre and the EEAS delegations deployed in conflict-affected countries have been 
frustrated by difficulties in establishing a clear division of responsibilities and commitments 
regarding the management of environment-related conflicts.  
 
Clearly, despite promises and expectations, the early warning system that should be the 
distinctive feature of EU strategy in conflict-affected areas seems more a declaration of 
intent than an achievement. To date, there are no European agencies able to predict likely 
migratory flows from different parts of the world resulting from climate change.  
 
Additionally, analysis of the European Commission-managed Instrument for Stability58 shows 
that Commission investments in climate security are modest, sporadic, and ineffective. 
While the Instruments for Stability (IfS) are conceived to support projects in crisis situations, 
the latest 2012 Annual Report on the Instrument for Stability59 makes only generic reference 
to climate-driven conflicts, merely indicating the relevance of pre- and post-crisis capacity 
and cooperation within the international community with regard to “natural resources and 
conflict minerals.” In 2013, four million Euros of the instrument’s total budget of twenty-
four million Euros was allocated for “natural resources and conflict.” The budget increase 
dedicated to natural resources could suggest that the Commission intends to increase its 
activities in climate-driven conflicts by enhancing its early warning and conflict prevention 
programs.  
 
3.2 Climate Change, Migration and Conflict: Making Sense of the 
Interconnection 
The abovementioned background presents the case for an analysis of the interconnection 
behind the EU’s policy intervention based on a better understanding of the evidence.  
Despite the lack of reliable estimates from the EU regarding the degree of environmental 
migrations, it is clear that continuing and unexpected environmental changes are already 
causing significant population movements. Academics and international agencies estimate 
that there are currently several million environmental migrants, and this number will 
                                                     
57 Babaud Sèbastien. August 20, 2012. "Towards an Effective EU Early Warning System." 
http://www.saferworld.org.uk/news-and-views/comment/51-towards-an-effective-eu-early-warning-system. 
58 With the launch of the IfS in 2007, the European Commission tried to intensify its work in the area of conflict 
prevention, crisis management, and peace building. Crisis response projects under the IfS focus on different 
issues, such as support for mediation, confidence building, and interim administrations; strengthening rule of 
law and transitional justice; and the role of natural resources in conflict. These activities can support situations 
of crisis or emerging crisis when timely financial help cannot be provided by other EU sources. The largest 
share of IfS funds were given to projects in Africa, Asia-Pacific, and the Balkans, followed by the Middle East, 
Latin America, and the Caribbean. 
59 European Commission. 2013. "2012 Annual Report on the Instrument for Stability. 
http://eeas.europa.eu/ifs/docs/ifs_annual_report_2012_en.pdf.  
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increase from twenty-five million to one billion environmental migrants by 2050, moving 
either within their countries or across borders, on a permanent or temporary basis.60  
 
A special issue of Forced Migration Review claims that climate change can affect migration in 
three distinct ways:  
 
First, the effects of warming and drying in some regions will reduce 
agricultural potential and undermine ecosystem services, such as 
clean water and fertile soil.  
 
Second, the increase in extreme weather events - in particular, 
heavy precipitation and resulting flash or river floods in tropical 
regions - will affect ever more people and generate mass 
displacement.  
 
Finally, sea-level rise will permanently destroy extensive and highly 
productive low-lying coastal areas that are home to millions of 
people who will have to relocate permanently.61 
 
Among the climate change scenarios outlined above, two emerge as particularly significant 
in terms of their impacts on environmental migrants originating in conflict-affected 
countries. 
 
 The first concerns the aggravation of droughts in less-developed areas. In the Sahel, 
for instance, entire populations have left an area to escape drought-induced famine. 
In these situations, migration is usually the last option, when all other survival 
strategies have failed.  
 
 The second pertains to rising sea levels. Sea level rise is one of the consequences of 
global warming that scientists expect to determine mass migrations in the medium 
and long term. Unlike floods and droughts, this phenomenon is irreversible, leaving 
migration as the only coping strategy. Estimates from the Swiss Academia of Art and 
Science predict a rise in sea levels of about a half to one meter by the end of the 
century. Today, 150 million people worldwide live in areas less than one meter 
above sea level. Almost three quarters of the people under threat live in the deltas 
and estuaries of major rivers in Southeast Asia. In addition, rising sea levels will 
cause salt water to enter coastal groundwater bodies, making the water undrinkable 
and disrupting agricultural production in the areas affected.62 
                                                     
60 International Organization for Migration. 2009. "Migration, Environment and Climate Change. Assessing the 
Evidence." http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/migration_and_environment.pdf. 
61Morton, Andrew, Philippe Boncour, and Frank Laczko. October 2008. "Human security policy challenges." 
Forced Migration Review. Climate Change and Displacement. Issue 31, 6, 
http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR31/05-07.pdf. 
62 Swiss Academia of Arts and Science. 2013. "Environmental Change and Migration in Developing Countries. 
Fact Sheet."  
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Raleigh observes, that these climatic factors are expected to intensify pre-existing problems, 
especially in developing and conflict-affected countries due to their structural difficulties in 
coping with and adapting to environmental distress.63  
 
Against this background, the extent to which environmental change represents a factor in 
migration decisions has been questioned. Highlighting that climate factors are rarely the sole 
driver of population displacement, a number of scholars64 have stressed the need to 
understand how one substantial determinant operates in combination with political, 
economic, and social dynamics. Barnett, for instance, has claimed that a “sensitive 
understanding of the way climate change may induce more migration in any particular place 
requires understanding the way it will interact with other factors, and ways these factors 
may change as climate change will have uneven impacts on even proximate social and 
ecological systems”. 65 
 
Others recognize that the direct causal links between climate change and migration can only 
be proven in exceptional cases, and, therefore, the concept of “forced climate migrant” 
should be questioned on a number of.66  
 
Critically examining the potential displacement implications of climate migration, Hartmann 
has noted that “while climate change is likely to cause displacement, the extent of that 
displacement will not only depend on how much the temperature rises and affects sea 
levels, rainfall patterns and extreme weather, but also on the existence and effectiveness of 
adaptation measures that help individuals and communities cope with environmental 
stresses”.67 Nowadays, Hartmann's point is a given. Both scholars and intergovernmental 
organizations, such as the EU, recognize that migration on a permanent or temporary basis, 
is and always has been one of the most important survival strategies adopted by people in 
the face of natural or human-induced disasters.68  This trend is continually growing. 
According to the last Foresight Report, “Natural hazards displaced seventeen million people 
in 2009 and forty-two million in 2010”.69 
 
                                                     
63 Raleigh, Clionadh. 2011. "The search for safety: The effects of conflict, poverty and ecological influences on 
migration in the developing world." Global Environmental Change 21: S82-S93. 
64 Swain, Ashok. 1996. "Environmental Migration and Conflict Dynamics: Focus on Developing Regions." 
Third World Quarterly 17(5): 959–973; Hartmann, Betsy. 2010. " Rethinking Climate Refugees and Climate 
Conflict: Rhetoric, Reality and the Politics of Policy Discourse.” Journal of International Development 22: 233–
246; Barnett, Jon. 2003. "Security and Climate Change." Global Environmental Change 13: 7–17. 
65 Barnett, Jon. 2003. "Security and Climate Change." Global Environmental Change 13: 7–17, 12. 
66 Black, Richard. 2001. "Environmental Refugees: Myth or Reality?" UNHCR, New Issues in Refugee 
Research, Working Paper 34. http://www.unhcr.org/research/RESEARCH/3ae6a0d00.pdf ; Castles, Stephen. 
2002. "Environmental Change and Forced Migration: Making Sense of the Debate." UNHCR New Issues in 
Refugee Research, Working Paper 70. http://www.unhcr.org/research/RESEARCH/3de344fd9.pdf; Bates, 
Diane C. 2002. "Environmental Refugees? Classifying Human Migrations Caused by Environmental Change." 
Population and Environment 23 (5): 465-477; Zetter, Roger. 2010. "Protecting People Displaced by Climate 
Change: Some Conceptual Challenges." In McAdam, J. (ed.), Climate Change and Displacement in the 
Pacific: Multidisciplinary Perspectives. Chapter 10. Oxford: Hart Publishing. 
67 Hartmann, Betsy. 2010. " Rethinking Climate Refugees and Climate Conflict: Rhetoric, Reality and the 
Politics of Policy Discourse.” Journal of International Development 22: 233–246, 237. 
68 McLeman, Robert and Barry Smith. 2006. "Migration as an Adaptation to Climate Change." Climatic Change 
76(1–2): 31–53. Perch-Nielsen, Sabine et al. 2008, "Exploring the link between climate change and migration." 
Climatic Change 91(3–4): 375–393. Tacoli, Cecilia. 2009. Crisis or Adaptation? Migration and Climate Change 
in a Context of High Mobility. Environment and Urbanization 21(2): 513–525. 
69 Foresight. 2011. "Foresight: Migration and Global Environmental Change Future Challenges and 
Opportunities, Final Project Report." London: The Government Office for Science, 9. 
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In developing regions, where economic systems and livelihoods are almost entirely based on 
agriculture and natural resources, extreme climatic events are especially accelerating the 
human mobility of those most vulnerable, such as landless laborers or tenant.70 Analyzing 
the adaptation patterns of West African rural households to the seasonality of rainfall and 
frequency of droughts, McLeman has stressed how the great part of the rural-urban 
migratory flows start out as seasonal: “Many rural inhabitants migrate to the city each year 
during the annual dry season, their numbers increasing significantly during years of drought. 
When drought conditions persist for extended periods of time, as they often did in the last 
decades of the twentieth century, seasonal migration becomes more permanent”.71 
 
This fact confirms that, while climate change is likely to cause migration, the extent of that 
mobility will depend not only on environmental degradation related to climate change, but 
also on the existence and effectiveness of adaptation measures that help communities cope 
with environmental stresses. Far from being a failure to adapt to a changing environment, 
migration can represent a logical and strategic livelihood diversification and adaptation 
strategy.  
 
Additionally, the relationship between environmental change and migration is often 
complicated by associations with other individual or contextual factors, such as personal 
expectations, human security, governance, conflict, population growth and poverty. 
Analyzing the impact of desertification on migration patterns in the northeastern Ethiopian 
highlands, Morrissey72 found that people’s decisions regarding whether to migrate were 
mediated by both structural and individual factors. These factors included the potential for 
livelihood diversification within rural areas as well as individual opportunities and 
connections in urban areas.  
 
Political stability can similarly intertwine with environmental drivers of migration. Since 
violent conflicts have emerged in a number of sub-Saharan African states, specialists have 
widely debated whether climate change migration could generate or aggravate existing 
instability and conflict in less-developed countries, which have weak state structures and 
very limited governance capacities.73  
 
The most frequently discussed scenarios involve climate change causing resource scarcity, 
which shifts to violent conflict, or resource scarcity resulting in migration that leads to 
conflict in sending, transiting, or receiving areas. However, despite the belief of the majority 
of authors that climate change may well result in increased conflict, this “predictive 
reasoning approach”74 is disputed.75 While climate change may well result in increased 
                                                     
70   On this topic see the analysis of Hunter, Lori M. 2005. Migration and Environmental Hazards. Population 
and Environment 26(4): 273–302; McLeman Robert and Lori M. Hunter. 2010. "Migration in the Context of 
Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change: Insights from Analogues." Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: 
Climate Change 1(3): 450–461. 
71 International Organization for Migration. 2011. "Climate Change, Migration and Critical International 
Security Considerations.” 22, http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/MRS42.pdf . 
72 Morrissey, James. 2008. "Rural-Urban Migration in Ethiopia." Forced Migration Review 31: 28–29. 
73
 Baechler Günther. 1999. "Environmental Degradation in the South as a Cause of Armed Conflict." In 
Carius, A. and K. Lietzmann (eds.). Environmental Change and Security: A European Perspective. Berlin: 
Springer; Barnett, Jon and Neil W. Adger. 2007. "Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict." 
Political Geography 26(6): 639–655; McDonald, Matt 2013. "Discourse of Climate Security." Political 
Geography 33: 42–51.  
74  Definition from Gemenne, Francoise. 2011. "Why the Numbers Don't Add Up: A Review of Estimates and 
Predictions of People Displaced by Environmental Changes." Global Environmental Change 21(S1): 41–49. 
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conflict, this path is anything but predictable. Although analyses do identify a clear link 
between climate change, migration and conflict, climate change does appear, however, to 
be just one factor contributing to conflict, and is not necessarily the leading or most 
important reason.  
 
Based on a comparative analysis of thirty-eight cases of environmentally-induced migration 
in the second half of the twentieth century, observed that conflict in receiving areas is more 
likely when environmental migration is combined with dynamics like native-migrant 
competition over resources, long-standing ethnic disputes between migrants and residents, 
distrust between the area of migration's origin and the host area, and socio-economic fault 
lines between migrants and natives competing over lands or jobs.76 
 
Furthermore, despite migration possibly representing the key way to build adaptive capacity 
and household resilience,77 this strategy is neither affordable nor feasible for all. Studies 
indicate that very few environmental disasters inevitably lead to migration. Affected 
populations can devise adaptation and mitigation strategies, sometimes grounded on their 
traditional knowledge, which permits them to extensively reduce the pressure to leave. A 
recent study argues that “migration is expensive and requires significant capital to finance, 
yet populations who experience the impacts of environmental change may see a reduction 
in the very capital required to enable a move”.78  This factor implies that when an 
environmental change occurs, the most vulnerable people have no option other than short-
distance migration and regional or internal displacement.  
 
3.3 DG Echo: A key Actor for Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate 
Adaptation? 
As described above, most large-scale human displacement for environmental reasons takes 
place at the intrastate or regional level, which poses different political and humanitarian 
challenges for the EU, especially if one considers that “unplanned, unpredictable and 
concentrated movements of people are more likely in scenarios of the future characterized 
by high global growth, but fragmented social, political and economic governance”.79 Against 
this background, this part of the paper will specifically consider EU programs implemented 
in climate-affected countries. This analysis aims to assess if the existing EU external and 
humanitarian strategy is adequate to respond to the challenges of multi-victimized climate 
migrants that originate or are hosted by conflict-affected countries. 
 
Principally through its DG ECHO, the European Commission has taken the lead in formulating 
EU humanitarian policy and in managing humanitarian aid for the victims of climate change 
and natural disasters in conflict-affected and developing countries. Since July 2012, 
according to IOM and Commission informants, DG ECHO has formally strengthened its 
                                                                                                                                                        
75   See, as instance, the analysis from Barnett, Jon and Neil W. Adger. 2007. "Climate Change, Human 
Security and Violent Conflict." Political Geography 26(6): 639–655. 
76 Reuveny, Rafael. 2007. "Climate Change Induced Migration and Violent Conflict." Political Geography 26: 
656–673, 668.  
77 Adger, Neil W. et al. 2002. Migration, Remittances, Livelihood Trajectories and Social Resilience. Ambio 
31(4), 358–366. 
78 Foresight. 2011. "Foresight: Migration and Global Environmental Change Future Challenges and 
Opportunities, Final Project Report." London: The Government Office for Science, 104. 
79 Foresight. 2011. "Foresight: Migration and Global Environmental Change Future Challenges and 
Opportunities, Final Project Report." London: The Government Office for Science, 15. 
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partnership with the International Organization for Migration to enhance collaboration on 
migration, development and humanitarian response, as well as to establish a framework for 
providing assistance in countries affected by slow-onset climate-related emergency, such as 
drought or cyclical hazard events. 
 
Since the launch of the EU-IOM Strategic Partnership,80 the IOM has become the key partner 
to DG ECHO in the formulation and implementation of the National Adaptation Plans of 
Action (NAPAs)81 for climate-affected countries. Although these policy documents have been 
conceived to broadly address adaptation mechanisms for climate change, they only 
occasionally make reference to climate-induced migration. Geddes and Somerville, for 
instance, claim that “NAPAs tend to include brief summaries of patterns of migration 
concerns over natural disaster leading to people movement, and references to people’s 
displacement as a result of development projects. The adaptation policies and projects 
within these strategies implicitly or explicitly aim at reducing the pressures in particular 
geographical area in order to decrease outmigration from those areas”.82  
 
Similar results were seen in an assessment from Migrating out of Poverty,83 a research 
consortium funded by the UK’s Department for International Development, whose findings 
proved that “the adaptation projects proposed in NAPAs that mention autonomous forms of 
migration, are generally concerned with eliminating or reducing the need for these flows”.84 
Remarkably, almost one-third of the NAPAs (13 of 45) contained policies aimed at limiting 
rural out-migration, and nine countries addressed issues related to pastoralist migration, 
which for the most part were designed to limit the need for this type of migration.85 Overall, 
these findings demonstrate that most programs for managing displacement resulting from 
slow-onset disasters remain in their infancy; only a few “NAPAs focus on migration as an 
explicit adaptation process in its own right, either to help preserve fragile ecosystems by 
reducing population pressures or to protect populations affected by natural disasters or 
rising sea levels, and where resettlement is referenced, there is little detail as to how it will 
be accomplished”.86 
Even in the case of rapid-onset disasters, such as floods, tsunamis or storms, few EU 
programs focus on migration as an explicit adaptation process to protect affected 
                                                     
80 See also “Working with the International Organization for Migration”, accessed January 21, 2015, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un_geneva/eu_un_geneva/migration_asylum/iom/index_en.htm . 
81 NAPAs policy process provide least developed countries with an opportunity to create national climate 
change  adaptation strategies that are country-driven and identify priority projects to be implemented in the 
immediate  
future. See more at “National Adaptation Programmes of Actions”, accessed January 21, 2015, 
http://unfccc.int/adaptation/workstreams/national_adaptation_programmes_of_action/items/2679.php  and at 
“Migration and Climate Change”, accessed January 21, 2015, http://eea.iom.int/index.php/what-we-
do/migration-climate-and-environment. 
82 Geddes, Andrew and Somerville, James. May 2013. "Migration and Environmental Change: Assessing the 
Developing European Approach". Policy Brief Series (2). Migration Policy Institute, 8. 
83 See “Migrating out of Poverty”, accessed January 21, 2015, http://migratingoutofpoverty.dfid.gov.uk. 
84 Sward, John. 2012. "Migration in National Adaptation Plans of Action." Migrating out of Poverty. Briefing 
Paper No. 2, 3, http://migratingoutofpoverty.dfid.gov.uk/files/file.php?name=napas-bp-15-mar-
2012.pdf&site=354 . 
85 On this point see Sward, John. 2012. "Migration in National Adaptation Plans of Action." Migrating out of 
Poverty. Briefing Paper No. 2. http://migratingoutofpoverty.dfid.gov.uk/files/file.php?name=napas-bp-15-mar-
2012.pdf&site=354. 
86 Martin, Susan F. June 2010. "Climate Change, Migration and Adaptation.” The German Marshall Fund of 
the United States, 7, https://www.ehs.unu.edu/file/get/7106 ; International Organization for Migration. 2009. 
"Disaster Risk Reduction, Climate Change Adaptation and Environmental Migration: A Policy Perspective". 
Geneva: IOM, 378.  
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populations. However, disasters that develop rapidly or are triggered suddenly, such as 
floods, leave little room for choice in terms of whether to displace. The magnitude of such 
disasters can be seen from these figures: “In 2012, an estimated 32.4 million people in 82 
countries were newly displaced by disasters associated with natural hazard events. Over five 
years from 2008 to 2012, around 144 million people were forced from their homes in 125 
countries. Around three-quarters of these countries were affected by multiple disaster-
induced displacement. The vast majority of this displacement (98 per cent in 2012, 83 per 
cent over five years) was triggered by climate and weather related hazards such as floods, 
storms and wildfires”.87 
In the EU, an emergency response framework specifically designed to provide humanitarian 
assistance to the most vulnerable victims of this kind of sudden-onset disaster already exists. 
The source from IOM references this framework frequently, noting that DG ECHO’s action is 
supported and complemented by Disaster Risk Reduction (DDR) and resilience-building 
activities, which feature an approach designed to take into account medium- to long-term 
visions.  
Recently, following the release of the “EU Strategy for Supporting DRR in Developing 
Countries,”88  the concepts and practices of DDR promoted by the EU have evolved 
considerably, and have progressively recognized the nature of climate change as introducing 
new humanitarian needs. Accordingly, the latest Annual Strategy for the Humanitarian Aid 
stressed that “for natural disasters, an average of 269 million people is reported as affected 
each year, and projections for climate-related natural disasters alone—thus excluding events 
such as earthquakes—show this rising to as much as 375 million by 2015.”89 This recognition 
has also prioritized the goal of Climate Change Adaptation (CCA) that today is addressed 
together with DDR. In the last decade, DG ECHO has progressively increased its involvement 
in DRR, devoting approximately sixteen percent of its humanitarian budget to DRR activities 
while developing DRR policy guidelines to guide implementation partners.90  
Since 1996, the core element of ECHO's DRR global efforts has been the Disaster 
Preparedness ECHO Program (DIPECHO). Defined by the EU as a “people-oriented program,” 
DIPECHO’s declared goal has been to increase the resilience of local communities in order to 
reduce their vulnerability. Through its programs, communities at risk of natural disasters are 
able to better prepare themselves to face environmental hazards by undertaking training 
and establishing or improving local early warning systems and contingency planning. Based 
on the results of its integrated humanitarian and food needs assessment, DIPECHO has 
planned its recent humanitarian interventions in eight disaster-prone regions: the 
Caribbean, Central America, South America, Central Asia, South Asia, South East Asia, South 
East Africa, Southwest Indian Ocean, and Pacific Region.  
                                                     
87 Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, Norwegian Refugee Council. 2013. Global estimates 2012. People 
Displaced by Disasters , 6, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/global-estimates-2012-
may2013.pdf.  
88 European Commission. February 23, 2009. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament of EU Strategy for Supporting Disaster Risk Reduction in Developing Countries. 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/environment/civil_protection/ah0002_en.htm. 
89 European Commission. 2013. Annual Strategy for Humanitarian Aid in 2014, 4, 
http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/strategy/strategy_2014_en.pdf . 
90 Channel Research. May 16, 2012. "Need Analysis, Review and Design of DG ECHO's Training in Disaster 
Risk Reduction and Climate Change Adaptation." 
http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/evaluation/2012/DRR_ClimateChange.pdf. 
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Figure 1. Regions targeted by DIPECHO and the major risks they face. Source: DG ECHO, 2014 
In the last decade, more than seventy-eight million Euros have been provided for the 319 
projects implemented in these areas,91 aimed at enhancing the regional responses to 
emergencies, resilience and disaster risk reduction, whilst at the same time improving aid 
effectiveness. Conceived as pilot projects within their regions, these projects often have 
been managed in close cooperation with local aid agencies and NGOs.  
According to a recent ex-post evaluation report, “There is clear evidence from evaluations 
and studies in many contexts that DIPECHO projects have had a positive impact, making 
communities safer: evacuation sites have provided safe shelter during hurricanes, cyclone 
resistant house have protected populations, early warning systems have triggered 
evacuations, trained intervention teams have provided rapid relief, etc”.92 
 
Notwithstanding these results, evidence from other ex-post evaluation reports 
commissioned and made public by DG ECHO suggest that these outcomes can be enhanced. 
Most DIPECHO evaluations93 indicate that the implementation of DDR related to climate 
change has occurred without a structured policy framework or well-conceived DDR training 
                                                     
91 Out of which twenty million Euros was for seventy-nine projects in South East Asia. Data from the European 
Commission. 
92 Grünewald, François, Mitzi, Donna, Latour Lagdameo A., Ocharan, Jacobo. 2013. Study Report Dipecho 
Study: Lessons Learned for an Improved Strategy and Approach. Inspire Consortium. Humanitarian Policy for 
Action, 3. 
93 See “DG ECHO’s archive” accessed January 21, 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/echo/en/funding-
evaluations/evaluations/thematic-evaluations. 
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program for ECHO staff deployed on the ground. Additionally, many of the climatic conflict 
scenarios faced by DG ECHO have been addressed without planning long-term interventions 
that take into account the specific and different vulnerabilities of each case managed. Again, 
most of the programs devoted to DDR and climate change adaptation in the target countries 
have been developed without taking into account the full range of risks faced by the target 
communities, and this oversight has often resulted in an inconsistent risk analysis with 
unhelpful impacts on the implemented risk reduction programs.  
 
For example, DIPECHO’s First Action Plan for the Andean Community94 was a program 
implemented in the Andean region beginning in 2001 to improve environmental disaster 
management through preparedness training, institutional strengthening, and pilot 
prevention measures for vulnerable urban and rural communities, municipal agencies, and 
local disaster-related agencies. The ex-post evaluation of this project95 found that the 
seventeen pilot projects funded through this plan were isolated, geographically dispersed, 
and disparate in terms of objectives, local partners, and types of activities. Evaluators also 
found poor coherence with other EU programs, especially those managed by DG-DEVCO and 
Europe-Aid. No coordination between DIPECHO and development services was found, and 
there was no effective dialogue between the disaster preparedness projects and policies of 
DIPECHO and local government evaluators. Interviewed sources stressed that DG DEVCO 
was generally not interested in DIPECHO projects because they were not focused on 
development.  
 
An additional important point for reflection concerns how DIPECHO programs interact with 
the governance of the affected countries. The lack of good governance represents a crucial 
issue in most DIPECHO-focal countries and is one of the reasons that national coping 
mechanisms are so weak and risks so comparatively high. This issue becomes apparent in 
the outcomes of the DIPECHO Action Plan implemented in South East Africa and South West 
Indian Ocean Region96  since 2008. To properly address human displacement due to 
environmental hazards in the region, the EU has to integrate its disaster preparedness and 
response mechanisms with appropriate tools to impact affected countries’ governance 
settings. Unequal development, conflicts, and poor governance weaken the resilience of 
local communities and adversely affect their environment, making it difficult to withstand 
the impacts of hazards and slowing the normalization process. 
 
Against this background, it is evident that succeeding in a conflict-prone or weak state 
requires DG ECHO to elaborate on common resilience strategies at the country/region level 
with DRR and other institutional actors such as DEVCO and EEAS. Despite the EU stating the 
need to overcome the gap between long-term development efforts and sudden 
humanitarian response in 2009,97 to date, few concrete results have been achieved due to 
                                                     
94 DG ECHO. February 13, 2012. "Humanitarian Aid Decision." European Commission.  
95 Alnap. 2001. "Evaluation of 11 ECHO Operations in the frame of the First DIPECHO Action Plan for the 
Andean Community." Alnap. http://www.alnap.org/resource/2975. 
96 Fourteen country-level DRR projects are being implemented in Madagascar, Malawi, and Mozambique. The 
implementing partners involved in DIPECHO are as follows: in Madagascar: Madagascar CARE, Madagascar 
ICCO/SAF, Medair, and Médicins du Monde; in Malawi: Christian Aid/Evangelical Association of Malawi, 
COOPI, and GOAL Malawi; and in Mozambique: Concern Worldwide, OIKOS, UN Habitat, and 
Welthungerhilfe. CARE, COOPI, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and UN-
HABITAT had mandates as regional coordinators according to their areas of expertise.  
97
 European Commission. February 23, 2009. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament of EU Strategy for Supporting Disaster Risk Reduction in Developing Countries. 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/environment/civil_protection/ah0002_en.htm. 
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the weakness of the EEAS and its services in shaping a targeted foreign policy for conflict-
affected countries interested by environment-related migrations.  
 
The European Union can overcome these problems by capitalizing on the good work already 
done and by recognizing the benefits of a common EU policy concerning environmental 
migrations in conflict settings. Therefore, the EEAS should try to embed Member States' 
single foreign policies into a larger strategic perspective. This perspective would be 
beneficial in mainstreaming DDR goals and climate change adaptation in all EU policies and 
programs dedicated to conflict-affected countries, especially in light of the declared revision 
to the UN Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015.  
 
If EU external relations are reoriented toward this type of longer-term structural change, the 
EU foreign policy chief could promote a new season of cooperation among EC’s services. 
Considering that planned and well-managed migration can reduce the chance of conflicts 
and humanitarian emergencies, the alignment between development and humanitarian 
approaches could impact the complex interactions of drivers leading to environment-related 
migratory flows.  
 
4. Conclusions and Recommendations  
 
This critical review has considered the EU’s primary policies, programs, and governance 
structure concerning environmental migrants who originate or are hosted by conflict-
affected countries. This phenomenon represents an important challenge both for the 
current EU’s system of governance and for the EU’s external and humanitarian action on the 
ground.  
 
Through this analysis, it has been shown how and why the current EU structure of 
governance, which emphasizes the unilateral management of tasks assigned to the EC’s 
services, falls short in addressing the different dimensions of environmental risk and conflict 
experienced by environmental migrants. Accordingly, research has substantiated the fact 
that the EU’s current political and diplomatic position has downplayed the importance of 
these environmental migrations; the EU’s approach has resulted in an unclear and 
ineffective response to these kinds of humanitarian concerns. To make this argument, I 
demonstrated that, while EU funded research and policy papers on climate migration 
abound, no specific policy addresses the topic of multi-victimized environmental migrants. 
 
This issue is all the more relevant if one examines the EU’s action on the ground. As 
previously discussed, DG ECHO is to date the key EU actor in charge of disaster risk reduction 
related to the environmental disasters; however, it is still unable to comprehensively 
address the different elements that ultimately affect migrants’ long-term perceived sense of 
safety, peace, and justice. These significant gaps in the EU’s framework for climate action 
require a new approach to improve policy coherence, especially in relation to the 
environmental displacement that takes place in conflict-affected countries. As Baldwin and 
Gemenne have emphasized, there is a “need to better understand how environmental 
migration overlaps with the issue of governance, development, security, and risk 
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management,”98 and they call for a comprehensive approach in research, policy and 
practice. 
 
Based on the political and institutional frameworks analyzed, as well as the criticalities 
apparent from the programs implemented on the field, the following recommendations to 
European policymakers can be made regarding priority areas of political interest for the EU, 
instances where further policy action is needed to overcome the identified gaps.  
 
1. As described in paragraph 2.1, the EU’s policies and structure of governance has 
been limited mainly to inter-institutional dialogue regarding climate migration. 
Similarly, at the parliamentary level, there is no significant political support for the 
issue of climate migration, except for the Greens and SD Parties. This situation calls 
for the enhancement of effective cooperation among the DGs in charge of climate 
change, migration policy, humanitarian aid and development. 
 
2. Specific attention should be devoted to the role played by DG Clima. Since its 
establishment in 2010, its main mandate is to lead international negotiations on 
climate change and to implement the EU Emissions Trading System. Regrettably, as 
shown by the EU’s agreement reached on October 23 and 24, 2014,99 the policy 
approach of DG Clima continues to be dominated by arguments over energy savings 
and climate policy, leaving little room for other areas of climate policy-making, such 
as those related to human mobility. To enhance coherence within the EU climate 
diplomacy mechanism, a comprehensive effort at EU level is required to mainstream 
the question of environmentally induced migration in each of the concerned DGs 
(Home, DEVCO, ECHO and Clima). This alignment should also help to complement 
the current energy-centered perspective with a more comprehensive policy 
approach, based on a better understanding of the impact of climate change on the 
Global South and on a better planning of the actions required to mitigate and adapt 
to the effects of environmental change on migration in the affected countries. 
 
3. As migrations related to both sudden and slow-onset events are likely to be 
predominantly in the Global South, at the internal or regional level, the primary 
responsibility for addressing the needs of climate-affected displaced populations is 
properly assigned to DG DEVCO and DG ECHO. These Directorates need to 
cooperate in order to take targeted and effective action on the ground. They also 
should take into account that different kinds of environmental degradation 
processes may cause different types of migration with varying implications for the 
aid and policy instruments to be put into action. In the early and intermediate stages 
of environmental degradation, migration may in fact be a rational and rightful 
                                                     
98
 Baldwin, Andrew and Francoise Gemenne. 2013. "The Paradox of Climate Change and Migration, World 
Science Report 2013." In Unesco. 2013. World Social Sciences Report, pp. 265–268, 265. 
99
 European Council, 23 October 2014. "2030 Climate and Energy Policy Framework." 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/145356.pdf . 
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option characterized by temporary, circular and seasonal patterns. In the case of 
severe or irreversible environmental degradation, migration can become permanent 
and may entail relocation of affected populations, either internally or in another 
country.  
 
4. The international dimension of environmental migratory flows expressly calls for the 
unmet needs on the side of the EU External Action. It is obvious that the EU lacks a 
strong common foreign policy on environmental migrations, because the Member 
States have not permitted one to emerge. Nonetheless, there is a significant 
potential for the EEAS to support adaptation responses in climate-affected countries 
through efforts to improve political stability and governance consolidation. In this 
sense, a more proactive foreign and cooperation policy is imperative, especially in 
understanding how cumulative vulnerabilities can interact in determining 
mechanisms of displacement that might take place not only in response to 
environmental change, but also because of a complex mix of factors related to state 
weaknesses or other risk factors.  
 
5. Additionally, the intensity of the humanitarian concerns related to the impact of 
climate change in conflict-affected countries calls for an immediate joint action from 
DG Home and EEAS, endorsing migration as a rightful adaptation strategy. Measures 
“may comprise strengthening the adaptation and resilience capacities of third 
countries to reduce the vulnerability of affected populations and enhancing the 
protection of environmentally displaced individuals outside the European Union. 
The EU should consider providing support to local governments to address migration 
as an adaptation strategy and to facilitate migration while ensuring that the human 
rights of the migrants are protected during the whole migration cycle”100. As Youngs 
notes, 101 this situation again calls for the definition of an effective EU common 
climate foreign policy that is able to identify the structural causes of environmental 
migrations in terms of social, economic and political exclusion, as well as grievances 
and inequalities.  
 
 
6. Considering that, the most important push factors for environmental displacement 
are sea-level rise, higher temperatures and drought, and the increasing harshness of 
storms, DG ECHO needs to develop targeted policies and programs for each of the 
world's affected areas. To enhance the EU's geopolitical role in affected areas, such 
as the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, the Andean region, and Southeast Asia, the role of 
development cooperation and the EEAS is essential, especially if the final aim is to 
promote policies that foster the long-term resilience of the affected communities. 
                                                     
100 Kraler, Albert, Tatiana Cernei and Marion Noack. 2012. "Climate Change & Migration: What is the Role for 
Migration Policies?" International Center for Migration Policy Development Policy Brief, 7, 
http://oppenheimer.mcgill.ca/IMG/pdf/ICMPD_-_Policy_Brief_-_Climate_Refugees_May_2012.pdf . 
101 Youngs, Richard. May 2014. Climate Change and EU Security Policy. An Unmet Challenge. Carnegie 
Europe. 
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Overall, the EU has so far taken action in an essentially reactive manner, responding to 
frequent humanitarian crises due to environmental disasters and assisting developing 
countries through an ex-post intervention strategy. Nonetheless, there is now room for a 
successful of change of course. In moving toward this new coherent policy framework, the 
EU should take into account the negligence of the past and promote targeted strategies that 
aim to strengthen the EU’s role in the global arena. Doing so requires new policy tools. If the 
EU chooses action over talk, it could reassert itself in global discussions by kicking off a long-
term climate policy response. This goal is achievable only if the EU recognizes the role of 
migration in the comprehensive framework of disaster risk reduction and climate change 
adaptation. As noted by Foresight,102 migration should not be omitted when these strategies 
are developed. Instead, this issue should be integrated into existing humanitarian policy 
practices, guidelines and forecasts that recognize early action and planning to be critical 
elements of a comprehensive approach. 
 
Obviously, this policy-making process requires participatory mechanisms to better 
determine what individuals and communities perceive as climatic security threats and to 
determine what is needed in order for them to feel secure. As stressed by Des Gasper,103 the 
human security approach can provide a comprehensive framework to approach multi-
victimized communities and to address the threats and causes of environmental migration. 
Using a context-specific approach, human security can become a fundamental tool in 
identifying prevention-oriented solutions for vulnerable persons. The EU needs to look not 
only at environmental security, but also at individual, community and political security.  
 
While the importance of local ownership has already been emphasized in the EU policy 
discourse, EU-centric strategies that intentionally or unintentionally exclude the affected 
communities from policy-making are still the norm. To tackle this problem, there are a few 
key issues to be addressed: coordination with development actors, mainstreaming of DRR 
activities in emergency response and development aid, and improved local capacities of EU 
partners and national structures in disaster-prone countries. One thing is certain: the EU 
cannot afford to continue a policy of ambiguity, which has bred uncertainty while affecting 
its international credibility.  
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